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Cross-Mediterranean economic and political relationships
must be rebalanced to include all of Europe.
Jun 20 2012
In the wake of the Arab Spring the European Union (EU) is eager to foster closer relations
with North Africa and the Middle East. Georg Zachmann,Mimi Tam and Lucia Granelli look
at the EU’s current policy initiatives and assess which measures countries should undertake
to help the economies of the Southern Mediterranean.
Europe and the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco,
and Tunisia) are tied by a long history of economic and political relations. Up until the early
middle ages, the Mediterranean Sea played a crucial role in ensuring flows of information,
people and goods between Europe and distant countries.
In modern times, this has changed. The Mediterranean Sea turned into a natural barrier
between the divergent economic and political developments on the northern and southern
shores. Initiatives for strengthening the linkages (such as the Union for the Mediterranean)
have often delivered disappointing results. The Bruegel Policy Contribution Eastern European
lessons for the southern Mediterranean looks at how to overcome the barriers currently
across the Mediterranean, and suggests the development of a Euro-Mediterranean Economic
Area by 2030. In the meantime, domestic reforms in the southern Mediterranean could be
encouraged by:
Providing much needed short term assistance;
A mid-term quid-pro-quo framework that links successful reforms in the SMCs to a
stepwise opening of the European labor and product market;
Anchoring the reforms to a shared long-term goal (a joint economic area by 2030).
Moving towards such a vision requires a better understanding of the economic linkages
between Europe and the SMCs.
In the Bruegel Policy Contribution How wide is the Mediterranean? we have attempted to quantify the degree
of integration between key European countries and the five SMCs (in terms of trade, investment flows,
financial flows, migration, and aid). The aim is to identify key-patterns of interaction. For this purpose we have
conducted a comparative analysis by putting the economic relationship between the SMCs and European
countries in the context of their economic size and their geographical distance.
Figure 1 – Distance according to total trade 2010
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade database (UN Statistics Division, 2011).
Measuring relative distance through bilateral trade, as shown in Figure 1, works surprisingly well for all
countries. The ordering of ‘distances’ calculated from trade data is largely consistent with geographic
distances. This correspondence becomes weaker whenever foreign direct investment (FDI) is used to
calculate the proximity of exchanges. Some interesting cases have emerged from our research:
France is one of the top two sources of FDI for all five SMCs.
Italy has invested relatively more than France in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. In Libya, Italy is less
involved than one would expect from its historic and geographic linkages.
Spanish FDIs are relatively large only in Libya and Morocco.
The United Kingdom, the United States and Germany are not significantly investing in this region.
Germany is even less active in Algeria and Egypt than the much more geographically remote US.
Figure 2 – Distance according to foreign claims on the SMCs (March 2011)
Source: Bruegel based on BIS Quarterly Review, September 2011
Note: The graphs represent the breakdown of consolidated foreign claims on individual countries on an
ultimate risk basis by nationality of reporting banks. The total corresponds to the total of the 24 source
countries’ financial claims reported by BIS.
Similar results can be obtained by looking at financial flows (Figure 2). Despite differences in the openness of
financial sectors in the SMCs, French banks by far hold the bulk of foreign claims in the whole region. After
French banks, only Italian banks play a noteworthy role in Egypt. All other countries (UK, US, Germany and
Spain) are under-represented relative to the size of their foreign financial sector claims.
Figure 3 – Distance according to migration stocks, 2010
Source: Bruegel based on Ratha and Shaw (2007) updated with additional data for 71 destination countries
as described in the World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011.
By comparison, migration flows (shown in Figure 3) lie somewhat in the middle between trade and financial or
investment exposures. They are shaped both by historical and geographical relations. For example, France is
a very attractive destination for emigrants from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; Italy for Moroccans and
Tunisians; while Spain only for Moroccans. Emigration of people from the SMCs to the US, UK and Germany
is again negligible relative to the overall number of immigrants in these countries.
Europe and the SMCs are not homogeneous blocks even in terms of official development aid. On the one
hand, the US and Germany provide significant aid, relative to their overall foreign aid portfolios, to Egypt and
Libya; on the other hand, France and Spain are the main donors for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. According
to these figures, the UK continues to be virtually absent in the region.
A strategic balancing of economic relationships could make the economic and political relationships between
the EU and individual SMCs more predictable and robust, which will be to the benefit of all partners. In terms
of investment, trade, and financial and migration flows, France, Italy and Spain are ‘closer’ to Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia than what geographic proximity alone would suggest. The advantage of this special relationship
for the SMCs is that they have three important advocates in the EU.
The flipside of this special relationship is that other countries – such as Germany and the UK – are relatively
more ‘distant’ from the SMCs in economic terms. This raises uncertainty. The concentration of FDI, external
trade and external finance on a limited number of partners is a risky strategy because it makes these flows
partially conditional on the economic wellbeing of a limited number of partner countries.
All three sides – the EU Mediterranean countries, the EU non-Mediterranean countries and the SMCs – could
gain from such a rebalancing of the economic relationship. But, to make this happen, all three sides would
have to move. The EU Mediterranean countries would have to support their northern EU partners in becoming
active in the region, for example by surrendering some of their privileged access. The non-Mediterranean EU
countries would have to increase their economic exposure in the SMCs, for example by enabling some
circular migration. And, finally, the SMCs should encourage economic activity on the part of nontraditional
partners by lowering barriers for all partners, for example by making regulatory and decision-making
processes more transparent. Hence, diversifying investment in the SMCs, and financial and trade flows while
making labor freely mobile, to involve nontraditional European partners and cover more intensively non-
western SMCs could be a good strategy for strengthening the relationships between the SMCs and the EU,
and making the ties more resilient. While in relative terms this might involve a reduction in the importance of
some individual EU partners in some SMCs, in absolute terms the link between all partners would be
strengthened.
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